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1 
Abstract 
This paper deals with the issue of migration between North Korea and China. North 
Korea does not grant its citizens the legal right to freedom of movement, but famine and 
poverty has forced many to attempt escape through China, hoping to eventually reach 
South Korea. Those caught attempting to leave are punished in forced labour prisons, or 
sometimes executed. Satellite images have revealed North Korea’s extensive network of 
prison camps, known as kwan-li-so.  
 China categorises North Koreans as economic migrants, illegally present, 
despite a valid fear of persecution. They are not recognized as refugees and China 
continues to breach the non-refoulement principle, turning them over to the North 
Korean authorities. Additionally, there is no process in place to determine the status of 
North Koreans and they are denied contact with UNHCR. Both states have failed to 
protect this group of people, and fundamental human rights are neglected. In this 
situation, human rights exist in relation to the state. As outsiders, the North Korean 
refugees lose their human rights and both states dehumanise them.  
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1 Introduction 
In September 2004, UNHCR announced that North Koreans in China are “persons of 
concern”. The UNHCR does not have any access to these North Koreans in China, and 
despite the risk to their fundamental freedoms and even lives China continues to return 
them to North Korea.1 Around 5,000 North Koreans are deported every year by China.2 
This is a serious breach of the non-refoulement principle under international law. North 
Korea has a strict policy against freedom of movement and those caught leaving the state 
are punished and put into political prisons. 
 Much information on the subject has relied on anecdotal evidence from 
escapees. For example, Shin Dong-Hyuk, who was born in Camp 14, is the only known 
person to have escaped from a North Korean prison camp and survived. His first 
memory is an execution, and in the biographical novel Escape From Camp 14, the 
horrendous memories of the human rights abuses he witnessed are recounted.3 The 
existence of the political prison camps was brought to attention by the media when 
satellite images were revealed through Google Earth. Six such camps have been 
identified, and the satellite imagery is evidence that the political prison camps are being 
expanded since Kim Jong-un’s reign.4 
 In June 2013 it was reported that North Korea again strengthened its border 
controls.5 Now, in 2013, the UN has taken long awaited action in setting up a committee 
of inquiry which will investigate the human rights abuses in the nation, and those 
responsible will hopefully be held accountable.6  
                                                
1 Cohen, Roberta, Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Seoul, 2010, Legal Grounds for 
2 United Nations, Committee Against Torture, List of issues to be considered during the examination of 
the fourth periodic report of China, 9 September 2008, CAT/C/CHN/Q/4, para. 3. 
3 Harden, Blaine, Escape from Camp 14: One Man's Remarkable Odyssey From North Korea to Freedom in the West, 
Mantle, London, 2012. 
4 Ryall, Julian, ‘North Korea expanding gulags, satellite images show’, The Telegraph, 26 February 2013, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9894275/North-Korea-expanding-
gulags-satellite-images-show.html>. 
5 ‘North Korea escalates border crackdown’, Amnesty International, 21 June 2013, 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/north-korea-escalates-border-crackdown-2013-
06-21> 
6 ‘North Korea: UN Commission of Inquiry a positive step in addressing crimes against humanity’, 
Amnesty International, 21 March 2013, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/north-
korea-un-commission-inquiry-positive-step-addressing-crimes-against-h>. 
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1.1 Aim: Questions to be answered  
1. How does China support its position on the situation of North Korean refugees 
and its breach of the non-refoulement principle? 
2. Is China’s argument sufficient to support its position or are there other motives 
behind the state’s actions? 
3. Is there any compromise for both parts that can improve the situation of 
refugees and not destabilise relations between China and North Korea? 
1.2 Restrictions 
The focus is on the policies of China towards North Korean refugees. China is North 
Korea’s northern border; so many North Koreans attempt to travel through China. 
While there are other actors involved, China has the biggest influence on their wellbeing 
in this situation, due to its proximity. Although I will give an overview of the situation in 
North Korea, the main focus in this paper is what happens to North Koreans who have 
escaped to China. Essentially, the human rights abuses in North Korea are relevant to 
the topic of this paper in relation to China’s breach of the non-refoulement principle. 
Although there are multiple issues affecting the relationship between China and North 
Korea, such as denuclearisation and economic dependency, the focus of this paper is not 
the political relations. Humanitarian obligations towards a group of people in need of 
protection is the focus and I will discuss other issues only in relation to how they may 
affect China’s policy towards refugees, but not as an issue on their own. 
1.3 Definitions 
Asylum 
The protection granted to a refugee in a nation where he or she can find either temporary 
or permanent shelter.7 
Economic migrant 
An economic migrant does not fulfil the requirements for being recognized as a refugee 
under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter referred to as the 
refugee convention), but for reasons relating to employment and livelihood, has chosen 
                                                
7 Plaut, W. Gunther, Asylum: A Moral Dilemma, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1995, p. 11. 
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to immigrate to a state offering more economic opportunities. Usually this term refers to 
individuals illegally present on a state’s territory. 
The principle of non-refoulement 
Refoulement entails the return of individuals who qualify for refugee status, back to the 
country where they would suffer punishment or persecution.8 Under international law, 
contracting states are obliged to abide by the principle of non-refoulement. Fear of 
persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion” prohibits refoulement by contracting states.9  The principle 
of non-refoulement is outlined in article 33 of the refugee convention10 as well as article 
3 of the convention against torture.11  
Refugee  
Some authors on the subject have expressed their discontent towards the standard 
definition of refugee, arguing that it leaves out many in need of protection. Despite its 
limitations, “refugee” will be used as defined in the refugee convention for the purpose 
of this paper, where a refugee is someone:  
who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.12 
Refugee “sur place” 
A refugee “sur place” is an individual whose fear of persecution first arises after leaving 
the country of origin. Refugee “sur place” applies also to those who become refugees 
because of circumstances in the home country that occur first when the refugee is abroad 
preventing him from return or because of his own actions that would result in 
persecution should he choose to return home.13  
                                                
8 Plaut, p. 12.  
9 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, Art 33(1). 
10 Refugee Convention, Art 33. 
11 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 
December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Art 3. 
12 Refugee Convention, Art 1(2). 
13 UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Reissued Geneva, 
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1.4 Method 
The focus of this paper is China’s actions and policies towards North Korean refugees, 
and how the state has justified these. I wanted to determine if there was any legitimate 
reasoning behind China’s argument. Therefore, the method that seemed most 
appropriate to answer the questions was an argument analysis. The main actor in this 
case is the Chinese government, and so I have analysed the argument supporting their 
refusal to accept refugees from North Korea. The most clear and detailed source of this 
argument is found in a document submitted by China to the Committee Against 
Torture, in response to the concluding observations of the CAT, from 2009.14  
 Roy van den Brink-Budgen explains that arguments are meant to persuade us 
through setting up reasons. These reasons are meant to sway opinion towards a particular 
position.15 In order to identify arguments we need to separate the reasons from the 
conclusion, through considering the function of each.16 Arguments always have a 
conclusion; this is what the author is trying to persuade us of. The conclusion of the 
argument is the point that is being made, and without such a point there is no 
argument.17 The relationship between the reasons and conclusion is important. The 
conclusion is drawn from the reasons and so the reasons must be sufficient support for 
the conclusion.18 The arguments given to support the conclusion need to be relevant as 
well as adequate.19 So to analyse China’s argument, I will need to separate the reasons 
from the conclusion and determine whether or not the reasons are sufficient to persuade 
us of the conclusion and whether the argument justifies China’s behaviour.  
 The layout of the paper will be as follows. I will first give an overview of the 
relevant theoretical perspectives on the subject of asylum specifically relating to non-
refoulement and responsibilities towards humanitarian objectives, as well as human rights 
in relation to the state. I will subsequently give a brief overview of the migration situation 
between North Korea and China. I will focus on the state policy of North Korea towards 
                                                                                                                                      
December 2011, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3, p. 19, para. 94-96. 
14 United Nations, Committee against Torture, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under 
article 19 of the Convention: Comments by the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
concerning the concluding observations and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, 9 
December 2009, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4/Add.2, para. 10(d). 
15 Brink-Budgen, Roy van den, Critical Thinking for Students: learn the skills of critical assessment and effective 
argument, 3rd ed., How To Books, Oxford, 2000, p. 10. 
16 Brink-Budgen, p. 11. 
17 Brink-Budgen, pp. 10-11. 
18 Brink-Budgen, p. 19. 
19 Brink-Budgen, pp. 20-21. 
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emigration, what causes North Korean’s to leave home, the risks they face in China, 
specifically treatment from the Chinese authorities and China’s breach of the non-
refoulement principle. I will then discuss the legal principles relevant to North Korean 
refugees and how they fit in under international refugee law. International treaties are the 
main focus here, but I will also give attention to the Sino-North Korean bilateral treaties 
and how they conflict with international treaties. In this section I will lastly give attention 
to the issue of dual-citizenship and how South Korean jurisdiction may affect the 
situation. 
 The main focus of this paper will be the Chinese argument defending the policy 
towards North Korean migrants. I will present the Chinese argument and subsequently 
go on to analyse it in relation to the conclusion being made. Then I will present academic 
views on the topic, regarding possible motives and explanations behind China’s position 
on the issue. Finally, I will present my conclusions, drawing parallels between the 
theoretical perspectives and the situation between the Chinese state and North Korean 
refugees. 
1.5 Material 
I have used a variety of different types of sources for the purposes of this paper. Since 
the emphasis in this paper is on the argument given by the Chinese state in defence of 
their breach of the non-refoulement principle, an important part of the material is this 
argument as a source. I have used the argument they provided in their response to the 
concluding observations of the CAT from 2009. This is the “Consideration of reports 
submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention: Comments by the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China concerning the concluding observations 
and recommendations of the Committee against Torture (CAT/C/CHN/CO/4)”. In 
paragraph 10(d) we find the argument provided by the People’s Republic of China in 
defence of their return of North Koreans on Chinese territory.20 This is a primary source 
of China’s argument in defence of China’s actions.  
 Other primary sources that I will use are legal documents. International 
conventions, national constitutions and bilateral treaties will be used to analyse the 
situation of North Korean refugees. Some of the reports I have used are also primary 
sources because they are empirical studies presenting the original results. The report The 
                                                
20 Comments by the Government of the People’s Republic of China concerning the concluding 
observations and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, 2009, para. 10(d). 
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North Korean Refugee Crisis: Human Rights and International Response: Human Rights and 
International Response by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland (2006) is a primary source 
because it is the result of an empirical study using interview and survey method with a 
group of North Koreans living illegally in China. This report presents the findings of the 
study, which is new information. I have used such reports both for background 
information, as well as for the findings that can be used to determine the status of North 
Koreans or the legitimacy of China’s position. I have used secondary sources, such as 
NGO reports, news articles, and journal articles to provide empirical information as a 
basis to understanding the context and to analyse the issue. 
 Many reports written by NGOs rely on anecdotal evidence and there are some 
limits on certain sources because of the lack of information. NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch do not have access to North Korean refugees in 
China and neither does the UNHCR. North Korea is a very secluded nation so 
information is scarce, and defectors may be reluctant to share information for fears of 
being exposed. Therefore, while I have relied on journal articles and reports for 
information, it is important to remember that it is not easy to verify a lot of the facts, and 
some of the information is inconsistent between sources, such as the number of North 
Koreans in China.  
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2 Theory 
2.1 W. Gunther Plaut “Asylum: A Moral Dilemma” 
W. Gunther Plaut discusses issues surrounding the protection of refugees and the duty of 
states to provide protection in his book Asylum: A Moral Dilemma. He looks at how ethics 
affects the situation of refugees and focuses on the relationship between moral and legal 
justice concerning asylum-seekers. Plaut argues that there is a conflict between the 
interests of states and the needs of refugees, and that legal instruments protecting 
refugees are weak and mostly favour the states.21  
 Plaut asserts that “in the tension between national and individual rights, the 
former wins out almost invariably, for the nation possesses power while the individual is 
reduced to beggary at the gate”.22 This tells us that there is often an asymmetry between 
the needs of refugees (individuals) and the interest of the state. This view demonstrates 
the harsh reality as it is; the state controls its borders and so has more power than 
individuals in need of protection. Asylum-seekers are vulnerable, while the state has 
control over its borders. Although human rights documents are put in place to protect 
individuals, this suggests that international migration issues are controlled more by state 
borders than protection of individual rights.  
 Plaut argues that moral values imply the need to make sacrifices to help others.23 
But he also points out that accepting refugees is a confirmation that the state of origin 
does not live up to international standards.24 However, Plaut describes refugee policy as a 
kind of “all or nothing” propaganda, in that either you save all refugees or none, but that 
a nation should protect as many refugees as possible.25 Plaut contends that asylum is not 
a legal right, but is a moral right, and that the only legal right protecting asylum-seekers is 
the principle of non-refoulement. He points out that non-acceptance of refugees is a 
violation of non-basic rights; refoulement is a violation of basic rights.26 In his view, a 
                                                
21 Plaut, pp. 3-6. 
22 Plaut, p. 6. 
23 Plaut, p. 142. 
24 Plaut, p. 140. 
25 Plaut, p. 141. 
26 Plaut, p. 24-5. 
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potential host state is not necessarily obliged to open its borders to refugees; this is a 
matter of the state itself and may take its own considerations in to question. Plaut claims 
that in reality a refugee’s only legal right is not to be returned to threatening conditions 
and that no legal right to asylum truly exists.27 
Self-interest of the government and morality of its actions represent two 
different sides, according to Plaut.28 When it comes to the self-interest of the state and 
the morality of its actions the former limits the latter.29 Additionally, the rights of 
individuals do not exist independently of the state, but in relation to the state.30 So, from 
this view, if rights exist in relation to the state, human rights must be dependent on an 
individual’s belonging to a political unit, the state. However, they often exist with a 
tension where the rights of the nation and the rights of the individual contradict each 
other. This creates asymmetry between the two rights-holders. Inevitably, there is a clash 
between the self-interests of nations and the needs of refugees where most often the 
rights of the state win out over the rights of the individual.31 
 In his discussion of different viewpoints on borders and migration, Plaut 
discusses Michael Walzer, a proponent of communitarianism in political theory. 
Communitarianism emphasizes the value of the community over the rights of individuals. 
From this view refugee rights are restricted, and the rights of the receiving community to 
promote its own welfare are emphasized.32 Walzer argues for the right of communities to 
choose members and for a shared identity. Walzer uses the metaphor of membership in a 
club to describe the structure of a state and he argues that states have the right to 
determine membership, using either policies of admission or exclusion.33 For Walzer, 
admissions policies should be based on political and economic considerations as well as 
the character of the host country and political community.34  
 From this view, states have the right to restrict groups of people from entering 
their community based on certain standards, and prioritise self-interests over individual 
rights of migrants and asylum seekers. Migrants are perceived as a threat to the security 
                                                
27 Plaut, p. 77. 
28 Plaut, p. 56. 
29 Plaut, p. 58. 
30 Plaut, p. 6. 
31 Plaut, p. 6. 
32 Plaut, p. 73-4. 
33 Plaut, p. 74. 
34 Plaut, p. 75. 
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of the host nation, especially refugees. Communitarianism resembles China’s perception 
of North Korean refugees as a threat to regional stability as well as the state’s attitude of 
picking and choosing which nationalities benefit from protection. 
2.2 Hannah Arendt “The Perplexities of the Rights of 
Man” 
 In Hannah Arendt’s book The Origins of Totalitarianism she addresses the issue of 
statelessness, regarding minorities who cannot be defined by nationality. She argues that 
stateless people have lost their place in society as well as political status. They become 
not more than the “abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human”.35 They 
are still human, which implies that human rights are not dependant on human worth but 
on belonging to a community.36  
 Historically, rights have been defined as being natural and based on humanity.37 
Arendt criticises this viewpoint and argues that rights ultimately exist on the basis that we 
belong to a society and have a political status and citizenship.38 Stateless people will lose 
not only their right to a place in society as well as to the protection of the state.39 “They 
are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to 
think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion”.40 For Arendt, stateless people 
lose their meaning to society. The rights they lose were what people thought depended 
on humanity, but in effect rely on political status. Human rights then according to 
Arendt, depend on citizenship or some form of political membership in a state.41 
 If no state is actually willing to recognize such transnational refugees and give 
them rights they can claim, they have no political rights in effect. According to Arendt, 
rights like being legally able to stay in a territory and have legal protection are based on 
citizenship and national membership because one makes a claim against the state.42 
Arendt claims that human rights rely on citizenship and belonging to a society. 
                                                
35 Arendt, Hannah “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man” in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New ed. with added prefaces (1973), p. 297. 
36 Arendt, p. 295. 
37 Arendt, p. 291. 
38 Arendt, p. 293. 
39 Arendt, pp. 293-4. 
40 Arendt, p. 296. 
41 Arendt, p. 197. 
42 Arendt, p. 300. 
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Additionally, if one does not have that membership, then one has no rights and cannot 
have any obligations. Arendt wants to show that society’s members have rights based on 
political membership and citizenship but not on humanity.43 
2.3 Roman Boed “State of Necessity as a Justification 
for Internationally Wrongful Conduct” 
Roman Boed’s analysis of the legal framework surrounding the principal of non- 
refoulement and rejection of asylum seekers at the border argues that protection of 
human rights is the responsibility of all members of the community and if that 
responsibility is not shared, then the humanitarian objectives cannot be met.44 In Boed’s 
analysis of the principal of non-refoulement, he examines the “concept of necessity” as a 
justification for violating international obligations.45 States have used necessity as an 
excuse for border closure when they violate international law.46 The concept of necessity 
is closely linked with that of self-preservation. The idea is the state has a right to 
preserve itself when its existence is threatened. However, states often use necessity to 
include essential interests that are not a threat to the state’s existence.47  
Boed uses an example of Rwandan refugees refused entry to Tanzania. In this 
case, it was claimed that national security and tensions between states were at risk as well 
as damage to the environment, so it was necessary to close the boarder to people in 
need. 48 There are other examples of states closing borders on such grounds. However, 
closing the boarding to people at risk of persecution in their country of origin violates 
the principle of non-refoulement. When human rights obligations are at risk the use of 
necessity should be prohibited because then the fundamental principle of refugee 
protection is disregarded. Overall, Boed argues that it is in the international community’s 
interest to honour non-refoulement and that this outweighs the interest of any single 
state closing its borders to protect its own essential interests. Necessity should not be 
                                                
43 Arendt, p. 293. 
44 Boed, Roman, ‘State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct’, 3:1 Yale 
Human Rights and Development Law Journal (2000), p. 43. 
45 Boed, p. 3. 
46 Boed, p. 2. 
47 Boed, p. 9-10. 
48 Boed, p. 2. 
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used as a justification for border closure to the influx of asylum-seekers.49 
2.4 The Responsibility to Protect 
Under the doctrine of ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, state sovereignty is a responsibility, 
not a right. Focus is shifted away from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as a 
responsibility on both an internal and external level. There are three points to viewing 
sovereignty as a responsibility. Firstly, the state authorities are responsible for protecting 
the safety and lives of its citizens and promoting their welfare. Secondly, national 
authorities are internally responsible to its citizens and on an international level to the 
community of states in the United Nations. Thirdly, the agents of state are responsible 
and accountable for actions.50 The responsibility to protect lies primarily with the state 
concerned. But when the state does not fulfil this responsibility or is the perpetrator, the 
responsibility shifts from state to international community.51 
  The main elements behind the responsibility to protect are the responsibility to 
prevent, to react and to rebuild. Concerning a humanitarian crisis, prevention is the most 
important and the first vital step. States have a responsibility to react in situations of 
compelling human need. So, states should do what they can in order to protect the 
human rights of citizens of other states when the need is present. And while the 
responsibility to protect pertains to humanitarian intervention, we can still see its 
relevance here. Human security is of utmost importance in the debate of intervention and 
sovereignty, and the attention is focused on protection and assistance.52 Prevention is 
one of the three elements of the responsibility to protect and should be exhausted before 
intervention is considered because failure to do so can have huge international 
consequences.53 North Korea has failed to protect its citizens, and so as a member of the 
international community China should protect and assist those North Korean nationals 
found on its territory.  
 As Boed argued, “the protection of human rights is a responsibility shared by all 
members of a civilized community and that, without sharing that responsibility, the 
                                                
49 Boed, p. 41. 
50 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, 
Ottawa, 2001, p. 13. 
51 The Responsibility to Protect, p. 17. 
52 The Responsibility to Protect, p. 17. 
53 The Responsibility to Protect, p. 19. 
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community’s humanitarian objectives can hardly be met.” The main point of importance 
here is that sovereignty comes with obligations to the international society. When other 
states cannot or will not protect their own citizens, it falls under the obligation of the 
international society. This means making some sacrifices, and in the case of refugees, 
protecting their human rights because this is an obligation that comes with sovereignty.  
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3 Background 
3.1 North Korean State Policy 
The North Korean state ideology, juche, was developed by Kim Il-sung and 
described in a speech given by him in 1967, and became the official state ideology in 
1972. Juche has been used to justify North Korea’s extreme nationalism, hostility to the 
international community and even self-reliance during periods of famine and economic 
crisis. Juche has “three pillars”, which are: domestic and foreign independence, 
economic independence and military independence.54 
Juche relies on political independence from all states, does not tolerate foreign 
pressure or intervention, and keeps cooperation with socialist nations to a minimum.55 
In theory, economic self-reliance means that the North Korean state does not trade with 
any outside actors and relies solely on itself for producing the resources to support the 
country. Military independence means self-defence and promotes an independent 
sovereign state, where foreign support is avoided.56 In practice however the political 
ideology led to North Korea being known as the “hermit kingdom” because of the 
negativity associated with international cooperation.57 Leaders of North Korea have long 
relied on brainwashing as a strategy: the citizens learn to worship the nation and the 
leaders,58 and to despise western states.59  
3.2 Freedom of Movement and North Korea 
The ICCPR states that “everyone shall be free to leave any country including his own”.60 
North Korea has been a state party to the ICCPR since 1981, despite seeking withdrawal 
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in 1997 with no success.61 The North Korean Constitution guarantees the right to 
freedom of mobility, however it is criminalised elsewhere. Article 75 of the constitution 
states “citizens shall have freedom to reside in and travel to any place”.62 Although 
freedom of movement is guaranteed in the constitution, it is criminalized in the Criminal 
Code. Article 47 of the Criminal Code states that 
One who escapes to another country or to the enemy in betrayal of his motherland and 
people, or who commits treacherous acts towards the motherland such as espionage or 
treason, shall be punished by at least seven years or more labour re-education. If it is a 
serious violation, he shall be punished by execution and forfeiture of all property.63 
Punishments towards North Koreans caught escaping vary, depending on the reason for 
crossing the border. There is evidence since 2005 of a harsher policy against border 
crossers according to Human Rights Watch, 64 and again in 2013 according to Amnesty 
International.65 Prisoners are subject to severe human rights abuses and Amnesty 
International describes North Korea’s human rights violations as “grave, systematic and 
widespread”.66 
 North Koreans suspected of wrong doing against the regime are detained in 
political forced-labour camps (kwan-li-so) without any legal process or trial. Up to three 
generations of family members are also detained in these prisons. The punishment 
usually lasts for a lifetime of isolation and hard labour. Between 150,000 and 200,000 
prisoners are detained in deplorable conditions.67 
3.3 North Korean refugees in China 
Famine, poverty and natural disasters have been huge issues facing North Korea. The 
famine was at its extreme in the 1990s, killing 2-3.5 million people. This has created one 
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of the worst food crises.68 The state ranks the citizens in a caste system, favouring 
political followers and disadvantaging those deemed less supportive of the regime. This 
determines who benefits from food rations and economic aid,69 and has resulted in 
extreme famine and poverty, as well as state-sponsored drug and alcohol dependency.70 
This method of distributing resources can be seen as a form of political persecution. 
Mike Kim argues that there are five reasons North Koreans defect: food 
shortages, to support family, to find medical help for an illness, interest in the Chinese 
lifestyle, and religious persecution.71 Using a sample of about 1300 refugees located in 
China near the North Korean border, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland have 
identified that 95% of the sample left home for economic reasons, 2% left for political 
reasons, and 3% for reasons labelled “other”.72 However, North Korean migrants may 
not be willing to give persecution or political dissatisfaction as a reason for leaving home 
due to fear.73 
Eric Yong-Joong Lee has categorised North Korean border-crossings into two 
groups: short-term visits to obtain money and supplies for relatives, and defections 
which are long-term permanent leaves due to either economic or political reasons. Since 
1997 many North Koreans do not return, remaining illegally in China.74 Punishment has 
become harsher since around 2005, and in the past escapees where arrested and detained 
for a short period of time before being released.75  
North Koreans escaping to China are particularly vulnerable to human rights 
abuses, especially sex trafficking. Sex traffickers specifically target vulnerable escapees, 
trying to stay under the radar of authorities.76 Many children born to North Korean 
mothers and Chinese fathers do not receive either citizenship. A child born in China is 
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entitled to citizenship if one parent is a Chinese citizen. However, many children are not 
registered because of fears of exposing the mother, and therefore such children do not 
have access to education. This creates a problem of stateless people of North 
Korean/Chinese ethnicity.77    
North Koreans escaping to China often travel to the Yaniban region, where 
about 2.2 million ethnic Koreans reside legally, since this region is the closest to the 
border and the easiest society to assimilate into.78 According to Stephan Haggard and 
Marcus Noland, the majority of North Korean migrants originate from northeastern 
provinces.79 It is difficult to say exactly how many North Korean refugees are located in 
China. HRNK reported that estimates are between 20,000 and 400,000. Hazel Smith 
argues 50,000 is a reasonable number.80 
China has been a member of the UNHCR since 1958, and in 1982 it became a 
party to the refugee convention, without passing national legislation to ratify the treaty 
and no national refugee process for admission. However, since 1986 all asylum-seekers 
are allowed to have a review of their status by the local UNHCR representative in 
Beijing. Those who have political reasons to reside in the country are allowed to do so 
after this process, or while waiting to be resettled. Despite this, North Koreans are 
routinely denied any access by the state to UNHCR facilities and UNHCR is not 
permitted to aid them.81 
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4 Legal Framework 
4.1 International Refugee Law 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states “everyone has the right 
to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”.82 Everyone has the 
right to seek asylum, which means that no matter the outcome, they still have right to 
apply and have their case processed. The only exception to this is if a crime has been 
committed that is not of political nature. “This right may not be invoked in the case of 
prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.”83 
According to Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, “the term ‘refugee’ is a 
term of art, that is, a term with a content verifiable according to principles of general 
international law. In ordinary usage, it has a broader, looser meaning, signifying someone 
in flight, who seeks to escape conditions or personal circumstances found to be 
intolerable. The destination is not relevant; the flight is to freedom, to safety. Likewise, 
the reasons for flight may be many”.84 The term “refugee” in international law has a 
much stricter definition than in everyday use. 
Under the Refugee Convention, which was adopted after the Second World War 
in 1951, the guidelines for protection of refugees and determining their status are laid 
out. China has been a state party to the refugee convention since 1982.85 Originally, the 
refugee convention only referred to people in need of protection due to events prior to 
1951, i.e. victims of WWII. However, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
enacted in 1967, took away this restriction, making the refugee convention applicable 
regardless of time and place.86 The convention states that the term refugee applies to any 
person who: 
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“…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.87  
Plaut argues that the definition of refugee is too restrictive and specific and that these 
standards were more appropriate for people in need of protection as a result of WWII. 
Today there are people in need of protection and frequently displaced for reasons that 
the convention does not cover, such as internal instability or armed conflict. Sadly, 
international refugee law does not protect those asylum-seekers who cannot prove they 
fall within its strict definition.88 Goodwin-Gil and McAdam argue that the refugee in 
international law is characterised by the principle of state sovereignty, territorial 
supremacy and self-preservation, as well as competing humanitarian principles, and that it 
is an incomplete legal protection because asylum seekers may be denied temporary 
protection, safe return or compensation.89 
 
Regarding the situation of North Korean refugees on Chinese territory, three articles in 
the refugee convention are of most importance: 
Article 31. - Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge 
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom 
was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without 
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and 
show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees 
restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be 
applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into 
another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period 
and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country. 
 
Article 32. - Expulsion 
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on 
grounds of national security or public order. 
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2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national 
security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear 
himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent 
authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority. 
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which 
to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right 
to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary. 
 
Article 33. - Prohibition of expulsion or return ("refoulement") 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.90 
 
From these articles, we understand the following. No refugee should be punished for 
having entered another state in an irregular or illegal manner, without authorization. This 
safeguards the right of refugees, as many do not have proper legal documents and also do 
not have the ability to apply for asylum before travelling. Additionally, a state shall not 
restrict the movement of refugees unless necessary and refugees shall have a reasonable 
amount of time, and all the necessary facilities available, to gain their admission. National 
security is the only situation in which a refugee may be expelled from a state’s territory 
and such a refugee shall have enough time to apply for admission to another state. The 
principle of non-refoulement, outlined in article 33 of the convention, prohibits a state 
from returning a refugee to the country where his life and fundamental freedoms are 
threatened. The only exception to this is if a refugee presents a serous threat to the 
security of the state. 
 The principle of non-refoulement means a state may not return an asylum-
seeker who fulfils the criteria for protection to the country of origin. According to 
Goodwin-Gil and McAdam, “the principle of non-refoulement… is the foundation stone 
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of international protection”.91 A country may limit its intake of refugees, but never send 
the refugee back to the country of origin.  
 There are no specific regulations for the procedures adopted to determine 
refugee status in the refugee convention or its protocol, which means that procedures are 
not uniform throughout contracting states. The UNHCR has outlined some basic 
requirements that procedures are recommended to satisfy.92 Two of the important 
guidelines are that the applicant for refugee status and protection should be given the 
necessary facilities to be able apply for protection as well as being allowed to remain in 
the potential host country during the time which the application is pending.93 
4.2 Application to North Koreans 
 What does this mean for refugees coming from North Korea? Do they fit into 
the definition of refugee as defined in the refugee convention or are they economic 
migrants as categorized by China? I will now turn to how the legal provisions described 
above are relevant to the status of North Koreans. 
 The majority of the North Koreans who leave their country do so for economic 
reasons and food shortages. However, returning implies a significant amount of fear 
because exiting the state without permission is criminalized. This punishment is arbitrary; 
freedom of movement is a fundamental human right, unless it threatens health or safety. 
Article 12(2) of the ICCPR states “Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including 
his own.” Article 12(3) of the same convention states “The above-mentioned rights shall 
not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary 
to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the 
present Covenant.”94 
 According to the ICC Rome Statute, “’persecution’ means the intentional and 
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity.”95 Additionally, it includes “persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
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gender…” as a crime against humanity.96 North Koreans are severely punished if caught 
trying to leave the country, and such punishment fits under the definition of persecution. 
In the definition of refugee as given in the refugee convention, an asylum seeker qualifies 
for protection if there is a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.  
 We have seen that North Korea categorizes its citizens on an arbitrary basis 
(caste system), based on loyalty to the regime and political support. Those who are 
deemed less loyal are denied or receive very little food and economic resources, and 
anyone who has attempted to escape the country is viewed as a traitor. Such people are 
punished based on belonging to this arbitrary political group. Additionally, religion is 
strictly prohibited and any person who is suspected of following Christianity or to have 
come into contact with Christian groups in China receives an even harsher punishment 
on return.97 Therefore, we can conclude that North Koreans are persecuted based on 
political groupings (those deemed not loyal to the regime and also those who have 
“betrayed” the state by leaving) as well as religion.    
One of the recommended requirements for the procedures determining refugee 
status, outlined by the UNHCR, is that applicants for asylum should have access to the 
facilities and a representative of UNHCR should it be needed.98 The states that are party 
to the refugee convention are required to cooperate with the UNHCR and allow access 
to all asylum seekers in order to supervise applications.99 Unfortunately, China has not 
cooperated with the UNHCR with regards to North Korean refugees, allowing no 
contact between the two. Neither does Chin have any procedure in place to determine 
the status of North Koreans.  
4.3 Domestic Law: Sino-North Korean bilateral treaties 
China has argued that repatriation of North Koreans is not only legal but also their duty 
to the North Korean state. In agreements signed in 1961 and 1986 the PRC authorities 
agreed to return North Korean nationals found in its territory back to the DPRK 
state.100 The text of article 4 of the 1986 treaty reads: 
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ARTICLE 4 
Both sides shall mutually cooperate on the work of preventing the illegal border 
crossing of residents. 
Clause 1 
In the case of crossing the border without possession of a legal certificate or without 
passing through screening agencies or the passage places stated on the possessed 
certificate, [the individual] shall be treated as an illegal border crosser. However, any 
person of the other side who enters the boundaries of one side due to any kind of 
calamity or unavoidable factors shall not be considered an illegal border crosser. A 
person possessing a border-resident pass who comes into a non-border area with the 
permission of public security and an entry/exit bureau shall not be considered an illegal 
border crosser. 
Clause 2 
Regarding individuals who illegally cross the border, depending on the situation a 
namelist or relevant materials shall be turned over to the other side. However, in case 
of there being a criminal act after the border is crossed, it shall be handled according to 
the laws of [the individual's] country, and the other side shall be notified of the 
situation.101 
This tells us that China has agreed to turn the identities of border-crossers caught on its 
territory over to the North Korean authorities. This together with the legal provisions in 
the DPRK criminal code means that North Koreans are in danger when on Chinese 
territory without permission. Article 31 of the refugee convention prohibits contracting 
states from imposing penalties on refugees for illegal entry or presence on their territory, 
having come directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened.102 
China holds that they have a duty to North Korea having signed the above treaty, 
although it clearly violates international humanitarian obligations. 
4.4 Dual Citizenship and South Korean Law 
Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) states “the territory 
of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent 
islands”.103 Geographically, the Korean peninsula consists of both the North and South 
Korean states. From this we can infer that South Korea does not recognise North Korea 
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as an official state and considers North Korea part of its territory. Under article 2 of the 
constitution, “nationality in the Republic of Korea is prescribed by law”.104 The 
Nationality Act of the ROK determines a Korean national to be anyone “whose father 
or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of his or her birth”.105 Chan 
and Schloenhardt argue that this combination of provisions means that North Koreans 
are entitled to South Korean citizenship.106 In article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention, 
the term “refugee” is defined. The second half of the definition addresses multiple 
nationalities as follows:  
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his 
nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person 
shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, 
without any valid reason based on wellfounded fear, he has not availed himself of the 
protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.107 
Although this means that a person with multiple nationalities, who has not for a valid 
reason availed himself of the protection of one of those countries, is not a refugee, the 
situation is more complicated for North Koreans. A person determined to be a North 
Korean national will be granted South Korean citizenship and although there are some 
regulations, in practice no North Koreans are denied citizenship. However, being granted 
South Korean citizenship does not happen until that person is on South Korean territory 
or gets diplomatic protection from authorities.108  
 Because of this, North Koreans cannot avail themselves of the protection of 
South Korea while in North Korea and in effect they cannot do so before becoming 
residents in South Korea. Therefore, the possibility of South Korean citizenship for 
North Koreans is not truly equivalent to having multiple nationalities. It is a potential 
citizenship and North Koreans cannot avail themselves of the protection from South 
Korea while in North Korea and not until they reach South Korea, if they do. Therefore, 
North Koreans should not be excluded from international protection on the basis of 
multiple nationalities. 
                                                
104 ROK Constitution, Art 2. 
105 Republic of Korea Nationality Act, 20 December 1948, Art 2. 
106 Chan and Schloenhardt, pp. 232-233. 
107 Refugee Convention, Art 1(A)(2). 
108 Chan and Schloenhardt, p. 232-233. 
 
 
 
27 
5 China’s Argument and Analysis  
5.1 The Argument provided by the Chinese State 
One of the main sources used to identify the Chinese argument comes from the 
“Response by the Government of China to the Concluding Observations of the 
Committee against Torture” from 2009. In section (10)(d) we find the following 
argument given by the Chinese state: 
10(d) On the issue of “non-refoulement” of North Koreans who have entered 
China illegally: 
The Chinese public security organs are bound by the Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens to investigate and process 
cases involving the illegal entry of aliens, which includes their deportation. In recent 
years, some North Koreans have illegally entered China for economic reasons. 
They do not meet the criteria of refugees set in Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its Protocol. Their illegal entry has violated Chinese law and 
disrupted the normal order of entry into and exit from China. It is entirely 
legitimate and necessary for the public security organs to properly handle, in 
accordance with the relevant laws and regulations, the illegal entry of aliens, 
including illegal entry by Koreans, in order to safeguard China's national security 
and maintain its entry and exit order procedures. 
As a party to Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
Protocol, China has always strictly observed the provisions of the Convention and 
its Protocol and has earnestly fulfilled its obligations under the Convention and the 
Protocol. The Chinese Government's selfless provision of refuge to more than 
300,000 Indo-Chinese refugees for a long time amply demonstrates this statement. 
The Chinese Government has consistently carefully handled the illegal entry of 
Koreans in accordance with the domestic law, international law and humanitarian 
principles. Facts have proved that the Chinese approach is appropriate and 
effective, and in the interests of all parties.109 
5.2 Argument Analysis 
China argues that they are bound by domestic law to process cases of illegal entry of 
aliens on their territory, which may lead to deportation. They categorise North Koreans 
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as illegal immigrants based on economic factors and claim they do not meet the criteria 
of refugee as set out in the convention. It is argued that illegal entry is in violation of 
Chinese law and disrupts normal entry and exit. They also claim that it is necessary to 
handle the entry of aliens, including North Koreans, due to national security and to 
maintain entry and exit procedures. They argue that they have always observed the 
refugee convention and fulfilled its obligations, having given protection to refugees of 
other nationalities. They claim illegal entry of North Koreans has been handled 
according to both domestic and international legal principles and that the approach is 
effective and in the interest of all. 
China justifies the repatriation of North Koreans by arguing that they are illegal 
immigrants. In the first part China argues that they are bound by domestic law on the 
“Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens” to process cases of illegal entry, which may 
include deportation. This part of the argument is very broad because of course a state 
will have laws in place to process illegal entry. This is an objective fact that does not 
support the repatriation of North Korean nationals. What the laws provide for and if 
they are in accordance with international standards is of more relevance. This does not 
further the argument because the conditions of repatriation and what makes it legitimate 
are not provided. All states put laws in place to deal with immigration and illegal stays 
and should ensure that the individuals who enter their territory are not a security threat, 
but this is not a relevant argument for repatriation of those at risk of persecution.   
The next part argues that North Koreans do not meet the definition of refugees 
under the 1951 convention because they are ”economic migrants”. This reason is often 
used by China to justify their actions. Their main argument for justifying the repatriation 
of North Koreans is that they do not qualify as refugees and are therefore illegal 
immigrants. Here it is necessary to determine if what they are arguing bears any truth. 
Goodwin-Gil and McAdam argue that a state may classify a refugee as an economic 
migrant or illegal immigrant in order to justify a wider freedom of action.110 But are 
North Koreans actually economic migrants or are they in danger if returned home?  
There is some truth that North Koreans are economic migrants, because of the 
huge famine and poverty facing the nation. However, the method the North Korean 
state uses to determine who is eligible for resources is a form of persecution, as the caste 
system ranks citizens according to political support. And even if many do originally leave 
for economic reasons, it is certain that North Koreans will face severe persecution once 
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returned. They face prolonged periods of time in one of North Korea's labour camps, or 
even execution. The argument that North Koreans are economic migrants that do not 
qualify for asylum does not hold and therefore does support the thesis.  
Asylum-seekers who are in need of protection should not be punished for 
entering a state in an irregular manner, and it should not affect their possibility to apply 
for asylum, according to article 31 of the refugee convention.111 Many North Korean 
migrants could also be described as refugees “sur place”. This category describes those 
who became refugees after leaving the country of origin, due to events occurring while 
outside the country or because of own actions.112 Many North Koreans may have been 
driven by economic reasons to escape, but since emigration is criminalised by North 
Korea, they will be persecuted if they return and so can be classed as refugees sur place. 
This is a confirmative conclusion: China argues that economic migrants are 
illegal. Since North Koreans are economic migrants, they are illegal immigrants. 
However, while such a conclusion can be valid, it can never be true if the premise it relies 
on is not. China uses the word “some” when they argue that North Koreans are 
economic migrants. They argue that “some” North Koreans come to China for 
economic reasons and so the stay of North Koreans on the territory is illegal. This is a 
faulty generalisation and only true with some conditions. Many come to China for 
economic reasons, but it does not necessarily follow that all do, and it does not exclude 
other issues, such as persecution. Arguing that North Koreans in China are illegal 
because some chose to leave for economic reasons is a faulty generalisation, and only true 
if there are no other factors to account for. This does not take into account those that 
have faced persecution before and the persecution they will face upon return, so it 
cannot be a valid or truthful argument. 
China goes on to argue that the illegal entry of North Koreans is in violation of 
the jurisdiction mentioned in the beginning of the argument and that it is therefore 
legitimate to handle the illegal entry of aliens, including North Koreans, in accordance to 
such laws. By defining North Koreans as illegal immigrants who have left home for 
economic reasons and not entitled to protection, they are classing them as aliens. The 
word “alien” repeatedly comes up in the argument. This is a biased word that does not 
provide any support but attempts to evoke emotion. The word alien de-humanises the 
subjects. If North Koreans are not human they cannot have any human rights. Using the 
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word alien reinforces the view that North Koreans are not welcome in society and so not 
entitled to the protection of the state. 
China puts forward the view that their actions maintain national security (self-
defence) and entry/exit procedures. However, using the self-defence and national 
security argument is very vague and it is not made clear what it is that would pose a threat 
to national security. Asylum seekers that pose a threat to security would be those that are 
criminal and could potentially put the security of other persons at risk. Seeking to 
improve one’s life and to escape persecution is not a valid threat to the society of the 
host nation. This could be seen as more of an “essential interest” of the state to maintain 
its sovereignty. 
As Roman Boed has argued, states have a right to preserve themselves when 
existence is threatened. However, states will often include in the right to self-preservation 
essential interests that do not threaten its existence. But, sovereignty is an obligation not 
a right to complete control. In this case, the risk of persecution is so great if North 
Koreans are returned, that it cannot possibly outweigh the perceived threat to national 
security.  
The first half of the argument is essentially a circular argument that does not 
really provide any justification for the thesis. China is bound by certain domestic laws to 
process cases of illegal aliens and deportation. North Koreans are economic migrants and 
therefore illegal, in violation of domestic laws. It is legitimate to handle illegal entry in 
accordance to laws, and North Koreans have entered illegally so the state should 
safeguard national security according to those entry/exit procedures. This argument leads 
back to the beginning, arguing that the state is bound by its domestic laws to process 
cases of illegal entry. The argument assumes that the domestic law is legitimate and that 
the entry and exit procedures provided in it safeguard national security. Such a circular 
argument is not effective in proving its conclusion, and hence, it is fallacious. It relies on 
a premise that the domestic laws controlling entry and exit are in fact legitimate, and that 
North Koreans are illegal migrants violating such laws. 
According to Roberta Cohen, “several years ago, a senior Chinese diplomat 
told {her} that his government does not consider North Koreans who cross into China 
to be refugees. They are like Mexicans, he said, who illegally enter the United States, 
“economic migrants” seeking to better their lives. When such people illegally enter other 
countries, they can be deported, he said.”113 This comparison between Mexicans in the 
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U.S. and North Koreans in China is used as a justification for actions against North 
Koreans. However, this is a classic “red herring” argument, attempting to divert 
attention away from the main issue. An irrelevant example is used as an argument to 
justify the repatriation of North Koreans, which puts them in danger. It is argued that 
Mexicans who come to the U.S. for economic reasons are illegal immigrants who may be 
deported, and so it is legitimate to consider North Koreans as illegal immigrants and 
deport them. Whether or not Mexicans who enter the U.S. for economic reasons are 
illegal immigrants that may be deported is not relevant to the situation of North Koreans 
in China. 
Much of the argument given by China is not relevant for what it is attempting to 
justify.  China uses irrelevant examples of issues to support their argument, and says, “as 
a party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol, China has 
always strictly observed the provisions of the Convention and its Protocol and has 
earnestly fulfilled its obligations under the Convention and the Protocol. The Chinese 
Government's selfless provision of refuge to more than 300,000 Indo-Chinese refugees 
for a long time amply demonstrates this statement.”114 The conclusion that China has 
always observed its obligations under the convention cannot necessarily be drawn from 
one example where it was observed. 
This is not support for North Koreans being economic migrants illegally on 
Chinese territory, or that the state has always observed its international legal obligations. 
This is an example of one case where they did observe international obligations, but the 
conclusion does not necessarily follow that they have in all instances, another example of 
faulty generalization. By giving one example of “selfless provision of refuge” the 
argument attempts to draw us away from the treatment of North Koreans, and to evoke 
emotion using biased words, such as “selfless” and “earnestly”. The refuge given to Indo-
Chinese persons does not support the argument for the deportation of North Koreans 
because it is not relevant. Neither can the conclusion be drawn from this example that 
the entry of North Koreans has been handled in accordance to international law and 
humanitarian principles. 
The argument presented by the Chinese state concludes with the sentence “facts 
have proved that the Chinese approach is appropriate and effective, and in the interest of 
all parties.” However, nowhere in the argument have they provided any actual facts that 
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prove this. They have argued that North Koreans have been handled according to 
domestic laws, which is true, but in no way justifies a breach against international 
obligations. Such a violation of humanitarian principles will never be in the interest of all 
parties, and Boed has argued that it is in the international community’s interest to 
observe the principal of non-refoulement, which outweighs the essential interests of any 
single state closing its borders. 
 There are many holes in the argument presented by China, and they do not 
present a valid justification. Examples and generalizations have been supplemented for 
true facts, and these are irrelevant to the argument. Using emotionally charged words and 
providing an example of a different situation is an attempt to direct attention away. It is 
now clear that evidence of their approach being “appropriate and effective” is lacking. 
Instead, we need to now look at some concerns and issues that may be underlying the 
Chinese position. 
5.3 Underlying Concerns 
 According to Chan and Schloenhardt, relations with North Korea are important 
to the Chinese government because they view it as an advantage to have another 
communist state nearby.115 Samuel S. Kim argues that Sino-North Korean relations are 
characterized by China’s ambitions to maintain domestic and regional stability, but have 
no further goals. Kim argues that the potential for armed conflict or nuclear standoff is 
one of the factors affecting Sino-North Korean relations.116 China focuses on 
maintaining peace and stability, specifically in the Korean peninsula, by cooperating with 
South Korea, but also by providing economic aid to North Korea in order to promote 
regime survival.  
 Kelly M. Greenhill argues that China fears the famine in North Korea will 
destabilize the nation causing a huge influx of refugees, potentially bringing U.S. troops 
to the nation. Greenhill argues that China’s main worry is a huge North Korean influx 
and that they want to take all measures to prevent this. China’s fear of North Korean 
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migration has given North Korea the ability to bargain on nuclear issues, and these 
worries mean China is hesitant to put pressure on North Korea.117 
 China attempts to maintain regional stability and prevent the rise of ethnic 
Koreans on its territory, maintaining influence over North Korea, through preventing the 
influx of North Korean refugees into Chinese territory. Kim argues that China’s foreign 
policy with North Korea is based on a principle of preventing future detrimental 
outcomes and preventing any situations from escalating. China has three basic goals 
when it comes to international relations: (1) economic development, (2) maintaining 
peace and preventing threats to its sovereignty, (3) and securing the nation’s status as a 
great power in world politics.118 
Despite China’s argument that North Korean escapees are economic migrants 
who are illegally present on the state’s territory, there are other concerns. Andrei Lankov 
has identified two underlying concerns. The first concern he brings up is that officially 
recognizing North Koreans as refugees would mean that China would have to provide 
some type of aid to them. The second underlying concern Lankov brings up is on a 
political level: officially recognizing North Korean migrants as refugees and giving them 
protection would open up an influx of North Koreans, possibly using China as their 
intermediate stop before a final destination, South Korea. This would most likely lead to 
the destabilization of North Korea.119 
Lee argues that China taking political considerations into account in regards to 
North Korean refugees does not respect international obligations. The problem he 
identifies is China being able to respect the refugee convention and its protocol in 
relation to its policies towards North Korea. He concludes that in this case, China’s duty 
is to respect the principle of non-refoulement, and that refugees should be able to have a 
say in determining their place of residence. The only exception he points out is if the 
North Korean in question is a fugitive of the law, having committed a crime of a non-
political nature.120 Lee concludes that the North Korean refugee crisis is so difficult to 
resolve because “each state concerned sometimes maintains an inconsistent political and 
diplomatic interest in determining the future of the escapees.”121 
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6 Conclusions 
In processing cases of asylum, the state ultimately has one main responsibility, outlined 
in article 33 of the refugee convention. This is to obey the non-refoulement principle. 
Plaut has argued that there is no true legal right to asylum or to immigrate to a state. But 
those who do fit the requirements for refugee protection should never under any 
circumstance be sent back to the country of origin, where their lives or fundamental 
freedoms will be threatened. Plaut contends that legal instruments are often weak in 
protecting refugees, and that some issues may be more linked to morality. The potential 
host state in reality will always have the advantage, maintaining its sovereignty, and often 
the future for the refugee remains unclear.  
 In this case, the state is exerting a “right” to sovereignty and the power over 
control of entry and exit. With every right comes obligations, and it is important to 
remember that sovereignty is not just a right but also an obligation. If a state is not living 
up to its obligations, than in effect it is abusing its right to sovereignty. The 
Responsibility to Protect shifts attention away from sovereignty as control towards it 
being a responsibility. Sovereignty as a responsibility means that it is the state first and 
foremost who has responsibility to see to the safety and welfare of its citizens. Failing to 
do so, then the international community has a responsibility. North Korea has violated 
its obligations and failed to protect its citizens.  
 For some states, sovereignty seems to imply total control over who is allowed 
and who is not allowed past the borders, with the main interests of that state at the 
forefront. Although the host state may not be able to support a mass influx of refugees, 
protecting its own interests should be in proportion to the well being of refugees. In this 
situation, North Korea has not protected its citizens and so responsibility then lies in the 
international communities hands. China, in not offering protection to North Korean 
refugees or attempting to relocate them to another place of residence, is denying its 
responsibility to the international community and asserting its control. 
 The Chinese government has maintained that North Koreans are not refugees 
and are economic migrants. But in reality we are aware that North Koreans are not 
merely economic migrants and that they do face a real fear of persecution should they be 
returned home. Denying protection to a group of people in need is a violation of 
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international humanitarian principles. When humanitarian obligations are at risk, denying 
protection due to security or self-defence should be prohibited. The interest of the 
international community outweighs the interest of any single state because as Boed has 
argued it is always more beneficial for the international community to uphold 
humanitarian objectives than for any one state to deny them. However, as Plaut has 
discussed, issues regarding potential refugees are closely linked to moral rights and legal 
instruments are very weak in regards to protecting needs of asylum-seekers. Therefore 
the state always has the advantage and it is important to consider moral issues as well.  
The Chinese state has taken a “communitarian” approach to the issue of North 
Korean refugees. The main concern of the government is neither the welfare of the 
individual nor human suffering; it is maintaining and promoting the stability of the 
society. China’s foreign policy approach to North Korea is based on preventing 
detrimental outcomes as well as preventing current situations from worsening. China’s 
goals in international relations, described by Samuel S. Kim, are apparent here because 
of the state’s focus on sovereignty and its own stability as well as regional stability. 
 Despite the needs of the North Korean refugees, we have seen that political 
factors control the situation. The interests of the state are prioritised over humanitarian 
obligations. Neither state is willing to protect this group of people, but issues of 
membership and citizenship are blatant here. In a sense, this group of people has become 
stateless. North Korea does not protect those it has identified as weak regime supporters 
and within the state they are completely stripped of their humanity and denied of even 
the most basic rights. China, in referring to them as aliens and not acknowledging their 
need for protection, dehumanises them and strips them of their human rights.  
 The situation resembles Arendt’s work on statelessness and human rights, 
where a group of people who have lost their place in society and political status in effect 
lose their human rights too. This suggests that human rights are not defined on the basis 
of being human, but rely on political status. And although North Koreans still have their 
nationality, this is a group of people identified by the state’s cast system as hostile to the 
regime. Those who have attempted to leave the state are seen as traitors. This cast system 
strips those in need of their rights and they become outside of society in their own 
country. Without either state accepting them, as equal citizen or as refugee in need of 
protection, they have lost their place in society and are essentially devoid of all human 
rights. 
 
 
 
36 
 Similarly to Arendt, Plaut contends that individual rights do not exist 
independently of the state but in relation to the state. This means that like Arendt, Plaut 
is also a contender for the view that human rights depend on an individual's membership 
in society; having a political status. Plaut goes on to argue that such rights exist with a 
tension because the rights of the individual and self-interest of the state contradict each 
other. This is exactly what we see here in the case of migration between North Korea and 
China: those who find themselves as outsiders in society, without political status, do not 
have the rights they should be entitled to as an individual. However, the rights a person 
should be entitled to and the self-interest of the state contradict each other, and since the 
state has more power, it limits individual rights creating an asymmetry. 
 Nationality should not be the determining factor in this issue; it should be 
whether or not an individual is in need of protection. Not legally recognizing the North 
Koreans and denying them refugee protection makes them outsiders in a society where 
they are vulnerable to human rights abuses. Sovereignty is a responsibility, not a right. 
China has concerns about how not cooperating with North Korea on this issue will 
destabilise the region. However, the responsibility to protect has been neglected by both 
states. Chan and Schloenhardt have discussed a solution to this problem. China could 
offer North Koreans some form of temporary protection instead of explicitly recognizing 
them as refugees. In this way, they would not permanently be protecting North Koreans 
but eventually transferring them to another state that can offer them protection, probably 
South Korea.122 
Ultimately, China has control over the situation. Without any access for groups 
such as the UNHCR it remains difficult to help North Koreans refugees. China 
maintains its position, and for the world’s most populated state, they may never have an 
interest in protecting North Korean refugees, opening up the door to a potentially 
massive migration influx. That is why it is important to find some kind of temporary 
solution or compromise, because everyone should be able to experience such a basic 
right as protection from the state. In maintaining control over its borders, the state also 
maintains control over individual rights, and “in the tension between national and 
individual rights, the former wins out almost invariably, for the nation possesses power 
while the individual is reduced to beggary at the gate”.123  
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